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28 March 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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*Argentina: [information as of 0430 EST] The armed forces have reportedly given President Frondizi an ultimatum to present his resignation by 1400 (EST) today. The reported ultimatum follows Frondizi's "irrevocable" rejection of a joint request for his resignation presented by top military leaders who gathered in Buenos Aires on 27 March. In an official communiqué issued early today, the Minister of Defense said Frondizi would submit a counterproposal to the armed forces "for their urgent reply." The nature of the proposal was not disclosed but unofficially was reported to envisage Frondizi's requesting Congress to grant him a leave of absence.

[] The proposal that Frondizi take leave would permit a skeleton of constitutionality which the armed forces would like to preserve, but it falls short of the reported ultimatum and is unlikely to satisfy many military leaders.

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*Netherlands-Indonesia: The decision of the Dutch Government on 27 March to send troop and ship reinforcements to West New Guinea may end prospects for an early negotiated settlement of the dispute with Indonesia. President Sukarno is likely to view the Dutch decision as a belligerent act, confirming his belief that the Netherlands is unwilling to transfer the territory to Indonesia. He is likely to order accelerated military preparations and new infiltrations of Dutch-administered islands and the New Guinea mainland.

In announcing the decision to parliament, Prime Minister de Quay stated that several naval units were on their way and that a "limited strengthening" of troops was also contemplated.

[redacted] two destroyers now in eastern Pacific waters, and possibly two submarines which have been visiting a Mexican port, are involved in the buildup.

*France-Algeria: Prospects for successful implementation of the Evian accords will be increased by the 27 March announcement that Abderrahamne Fares, a highly respected Moslem and former president of the Algerian Assembly, will head the provisional executive which is to "direct the administrative and civil services of Algeria" and prepare for the self-determination referendum planned for late June or early July. Fares' arrival in Algeria will again confront the OAS with the alternative of showing it can prevent De Gaulle's steps to implement the accords or risking a decline in its popular support, especially since the OAS made no move to interfere with the installation of High Commissioner Fouchet this week. Despite the strikes in Algiers and Oran on 27 March, protesting the firing on European demonstrators in Algiers on 26 March, these cities remained relatively calm. Government officials in Algiers have expressed regret for the 26 March incident, but have reiterated that the security forces will continue to keep order by whatever means they deem necessary. Two conservative Paris newspapers, however, have sharply criticized the 26 March incident.

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European Common Market: [The Common Market (EEC) is aroused and bitter over the recently announced US decision to raise tariffs on Belgian carpets and glass. According to a spokesman for the EEC's executive commission, the EEC intends to seek consultations with the US to discuss not only the justification for the US action, but the whole question of US-EEC trading relations. If satisfaction is not received in these talks, retaliatory action of a "drastic character" will be taken. The official stressed that the issue is now a community matter, and retaliation would seriously affect US exports to the EEC, not just to Belgium. He added that the Belgian trade minister has said that Brussels will veto any further EEC-US tariff negotiations unless the matter is satisfactorily settled. The EEC's council of ministers has scheduled a discussion of the matter for 4 April.]

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Cuba: Fidel Castro's 26 March denigration of Anibal Escalante, 53-year-old veteran Cuban Communist leader, confirms that a conflict within the top Cuban leadership--long the subject of speculation--does in fact exist, although the issues involved remain unclear. Escalante, who joined the Popular Socialist (Communist) party in 1932, was generally considered to be the party's third-ranking leader before it absorbed other revolutionary groups and became the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) last year. Escalante was named on 9 March to the 25-member National Directorate of the ORI. Castro charged

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that he was guilty of "serious errors" by following a "non-Marxist and deviationist line" in his efforts to "set up an apparatus to pursue ends of a personal nature."

The Cuban premier's warning at the close of his 26 March speech that "from this moment on all differences between the old and the new must end," suggests that the conflict may be between the old guard doctrinaire party members and the younger, more radical leaders associated with Castro. Castro's position does not appear to be compromised, nor does it appear that the most influential veteran Communists, Blas Roca and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, are in any sense in conflict with Castro. It is possible that Escalante is being purged by his colleagues for "Stalinism" and a reluctance to adjust to the principle of collective leadership.

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Spain: The forthcoming nomination of Antonio Garrigues as the new Spanish ambassador in Washington marks a significant move by Franco toward closer relations with the Kennedy administration, in the view of the American Embassy in Madrid. Very pro-American, Garrigues is a Monarchist who has not been closely identified with the Franco regime; his appointment would further indicate Franco's desire to facilitate renegotiation of the base agreements which expire in September 1963. As a lawyer, Garrigues contributed legal advice during the development of US bases in Spain.

In offering him the post, the foreign minister emphasized that the present is a time of "important political and economic changes in Spain." Spain is slowly liberalizing its economy and plans eventual adherence to the European Common Market. The foreign minister may also have been hinting that Franco plans some early political innovation, perhaps a clarification of the succession problem and of the outlook for restoration of the monarchy.

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Middle East: Locusts threaten food crops in Jordan, Israel, Iran, Syria, and possibly southeastern Turkey and the Sinal Peninsula during the next several months. For the past three years a number of these countries have depended on emergency assistance from the United States to make up for severe weather

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damage to crops. Although the outlook for crops in the area this year has been generally bright, widespread locust damage would result in another serious grain shortage. Some damage has already been reported by UN-sponsored observers in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and West Pakistan.

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Situation Report--Ruanda-Urundi: The termination of the Belgian trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi on 1 July, as now tentatively scheduled by a UN General Assembly resolution, is almost certain to result in a breakdown of internal order should Belgian forces be required to depart and no adequate substitute for Belgian authority be developed. These areas are the scene of continuing violent tribal and political struggles; each is opposed to efforts to combine them into a single state. Neither area is economically viable; each depends on Belgian nationals to conduct its affairs and maintain security. Radical Afro-Asian and Soviet bloc states are pressing for Belgian withdrawal

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as early as possible. Brussels is sensitive to Afro-Asian criticism of its actions in the Congo and is anxious to divest itself of the economic burden of maintaining the trusteeship. Brussels is willing to provide economic and technical assistance after independence, but only if its nationals in the area are protected. [redacted]

*Syria: (information as of 0430 EST) The Syrian army command assumed power early this morning without disorders. President Qudsi and the Dawalibi cabinet have resigned, and the parliament elected last December has been dissolved. Army Chief of Staff Zahr al-Din advised Ambassador Knight that there would be no change in foreign policy and that new elections would be held shortly. The tone of a communiqué broadcast over Damascus Radio explaining the army's action indicates that radical Arab nationalist army elements--dis-satisfied with the government's conservative policies--appar-ently induced the army command to act. Socialist sentiment is so strong among many army officers that any new regime is likely to be considerably to the left of the Qudsi-Dawalibi government. [redacted]

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
Situation in Algeria

Until his arrest in Paris last November on charges of directing rebel "tax" collections in metropolitan France, Fares was considered loyal to France despite his well-known sympathy for the rebels. In 1956 he publicly urged Paris to negotiate with the rebels "before it is too late." During the negotiations, the PAG reportedly agreed to Fares' designation with reluctance, probably fearing that under a person of his stature the provisional executive might come to rival the PAG in authority. The PAG may also have been disturbed by Fares' closeness to former premier Ferhat Abbas. Although both sides are said to have agreed that Fares will be relieved of all duties when Algeria becomes independent, Consul General Porter in Algiers feels that his performance may so increase his prestige that the Algerian leaders will have to take him into account. Porter also points out that, intentionally or otherwise, Fares' reputation will focus attention on the joint Moslem-French provisional executive rather than on Fouchet, the French high commissioner, who is less well-known.

The French Government has announced that the 25 March capture of ex-General Jouhaud, OAS leader for the Oran area, resulted from military intelligence that Jouhaud was in Oran. The US army attaché in Paris comments that this is further evidence of army loyalty to the government, and consequent failure of the OAS to obtain military complicity in its efforts to sabotage the accords. The army's repulse of an armed OAS attack designed to rescue Jouhaud also demonstrates the army's willingness to enforce government policy.

Meanwhile, a French Foreign Ministry official has informed a US Embassy officer that Paris has no intention of demanding the recall of the Czech, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian ambassadors despite their countries' de jure recognition of the PAG. He indicated that by this means the French--who demanded the Soviet ambassador's recall on 26 March following Khrushchev's de jure recognition of the PAG--can show their "contempt."

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[for the Soviet satellites, which have to follow Moscow's example, as well as for Albania]

[Although the 27 March Soviet declaration on France's recall of its ambassador to Moscow charged France with seeking to worsen relations between the two countries, Moscow seems to be somewhat defensive about its quick recognition of the rebels and does not appear desirous of further aggravating relations with France over this issue.]

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Situation Report: Ruanda-Urundi

The Hutu people, who comprise 85 percent of the population in both Ruanda and Urundi, have, with the overt support of Belgium, established themselves in power in Ruanda, dispossessing their former Tutsi overlords. Some 200,000 Tutsis, endangered by Hutu terrorists intent on consolidating Hutu control, have fled into neighboring Urundi, the Congo, Uganda, and Tanganyika. With the assistance of radical African states, they plot the return of the Ruanda "king," Mwami Kigeri V. Tutsi counterterrorist bands constantly "invade" Ruanda with the aim of creating sufficient chaos to nullify the Hutu takeover.

Tribal antagonisms are more blurred in Urundi, and a Hutu-led "revolution" similar to that in Ruanda is only beginning. The Urundi "king," Mwami Mwambutsa, enjoys wide influence among the Hutu masses. Last September, a Tutsi-dominated party, UPRONA, which has a history of being anti-Belgian and antiwhite and has close relations with radical African leaders, won an overwhelming electoral victory over the Belgian-supported parties. Strains between the UPRONA government and Belgian administrators have sharply increased, and tribal hostility is becoming more evident as UPRONA struggles to consolidate its position. The assassination of Urundi's first UPRONA premier--Prince Louis Rwagasore, son of the Mwami--at the hands of the defeated parties has shaken UPRONA's confidence, and party extremists are gaining strength. Moreover, a new and predominantly Hutu-based party has been formed which openly advocates the overthrow of the UPRONA government and the establishment of Hutu control in Urundi as in Ruanda.

Belgium, highly sensitive to Afro-Asian criticism of its actions in the adjoining Congo, is anxious to divest itself of Ruanda-Urundi. Brussels is at the same time, however, acutely aware of the chaos which would result from a precipitate withdrawal, and is willing to continue to grant financial and technical

assistance. Brussels, according to Foreign Minister Spaak, contributes approximately \$20 million annually to Ruanda-Urundi. It insists, however, that it cannot continue to assist or maintain its nationals there (1,800 civil servants) unless there are adequate security precautions. Belgium now maintains 1,200 paratroopers there, a figure it regards as a bare minimum. Native forces, not yet adequately trained, number 700-800 in each area. The UN resolution calls for the withdrawal of Belgian military forces before independence with the exception of military personnel whose retention--in the view of the UN Commission and Ruanda-Urundi authorities--is deemed necessary as an interim measure.

The Afro-Asian states are anxious to "punish" Belgium for its colonial behavior and to push it out as rapidly as possible. They are afraid that early independence would leave Belgium in control in Ruanda, but equally afraid they will offend the government of Urundi if they oppose it. They want a unified Ruanda-Urundi state to emerge, while knowing that both areas vigorously oppose the idea. At the recent UN discussions, they tried to sidestep the problem by sending a new five-member UN commission, made up of representatives of Liberia, Togo, Morocco, Iran, and Haiti, to make a new study of the area and report back to the resumed session of the 16th General Assembly in early June. In the light of this report the UN General Assembly is to make a final determination on the date of independence, now envisaged on 1 July. [redacted]

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